03-11 "Clocks, Creation, and Clarity: Insights on Ethics and Economics from a Feminist Perspective" by Julie A. Nelson
 
 
GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENT INSTITUTE 





Clocks, Creation, and Clarity:  
Insights on Ethics and Economics from a Feminist 
Perspective 
 













Medford MA 02155, USA 





Clocks, Creation and Clarity: Insights on Ethics and 
Economics from a Feminist Perspective
1 
 





This essay discusses the origins, biases, and effects on contemporary discussions of 
economics and ethics of the unexamined use of the metaphor “an economy is a machine.” 
The neoliberal view that the self-regulated workings of free markets should be kept free 
of impediments is based on this metaphor.  Many of the critiques of capitalist systems 
are, as well. The belief that economists simply uncover universal “laws of motion” of  
economies, however, is shown to be based on a variety of rationalist thinking that—while 
widely held—is inadequate for explaining lived human experience.  Feminist scholarship 
in philosophy of science and economics has brought to light some of the biases that have 
supported the mechanistic worldview.  By structuring thought and language in dualistic 
categories such that alternatives to a mechanistic worldview are labeled as “soft,” the 
mechanistic view maintains some of its power by seeming “masculine” and “tough.” 
Possible alternatives to the “an economy is a machine” metaphor are discussed in their 
relation to developments in philosophy, psychology, and the natural sciences.  The essay 
argues that metaphors such as “an economy is a creative process” and “an economy is an 
organism” are both intellectually defensible as guides to scientific inquiry and provide a 
richer ground for moral imagination.  
 
 
                                                            
1 This essay was  presented at the meetings of the Societas Ethica in Sigtuna, Sweden, August 2003 on the 
theme of “Economics, Justice, and Welfare.”  I thank Carl-Henric Grenholm and the Society for the 
invitation to speak, Ann-Cathrin Jarl for inspiration and encouragement, and attendees of the conference for 
their very helpful comments. A shortened version of this essay will be submitted to a special issue of  
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. GDAE Working Paper No. 03-11: Clocks, Creation, and Clarity 
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1. Introduction 
  For an audience of mainstream economists, the first order of business when 
addressing the subject of “economics and ethics” is always to justify  spending any time 
on the topic.  What, after all, does ethics—a normative subject—have to do with 
economics?  To most of my economist colleagues, economics is a positive science that 
seeks to understand the mechanisms underlying economic systems, primarily though 
application of ever-more-sophisticated mathematical models and econometric tests.  
Ethics, to them, seems like a soft, subjective, squishy subject, necessarily encompassing 
value judgments and ambiguity—not, in their perception, a “hard” field, with clear, 
objective, and defensible results, like their own.  Most economists believe that economic 
science can proceed just fine without attention to ethics. 
  To the audience of ethicists from the fields of philosophy and religion to which 
this essay is addressed, however, I presumably do not need to justify ethics as an 
interesting subject.  And since the theme of this volume is about economics and ethics, I 
do not need to justify the relevance of economic issues to ethical concerns.   
  What I find surprising, however, in much of the literature I’ve read on economics 
and ethics from the side of ethicists is the amount of agreement that they express with 
some of the very same—and highly questionable—assumptions that allow my economist 
colleagues to dismiss ethical concerns so easily. I find these areas of agreement in the 
works of  politically conservative advocates of free markets and in the works of 
politically progressive critics, in the work of religious scholars and of secular scholars.   
2. The “Science” Trump Card 
  The problem, as I see it, is that mainstream economists have generally 
successfully—and deceptively—played the “science” trump card in dealing with 
philosophical and religious ethicists.   
  Many scholars implicitly assume that mainstream economists, though scientific 
study, have discovered what is really going on in market economies, and that others must 
bow to their expertise.  Christian ethicist John Atherton, for example, defers in an article 
on “Where do Spirituality and Economics Meet?” to economists’ knowledge of the 
“mechanisms and systems” that make up “the reality of the relatively autonomous world 
of economics” (1994, pp. 10,11).
2   For Atherton, the recognition of this “relatively 
autonomous” realm justifies supporting serious consideration of Christian conservatism.  
  The same idea also appears in philosophy from the progressive left.  For example, 
in the New Left Review political theorist Nancy Fraser writes about “relatively 
autonomous markets” that “follow a logic of their own” separated from culture and 
values (2000, p.11).  Even religious scholars committed to a view of a living, breathing 
universe generally seem to come to a halt when they get to the economics boundary: Ken 
                                                            
2 Nothing in the present paper should be construed as an argument against a much more modest point in 
favor of at least partial reliance on market systems: markets can have significant informational advantages 
over systems of central planning. The vast majority of observers of economies, even on the left, now grant 
that elements of market coordination can be helpful.  Current debates are about achieving an appropriate 
mix of  “free” market, regulated market, and non-market forms of organization. GDAE Working Paper No. 03-11: Clocks, Creation, and Clarity 
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Jones in The New Social Face of Buddhism states, for example, that corporate polices are 
“determined by the ‘logic of the market’” (2003, p.162).     
  All these scholars take as a truism that capitalist market economies function 
according to universal and amoral laws—whether the purpose of the writer is to argue for 
such systems or to seek to derail them. They accept the notion that market systems are 
mechanisms bound to the logic of competitive “market forces” and fueled by the energy 
of self-interest.  They assume that contemporary economies function on a plane where  
the sorts of values—like responsibility and compassion—that we demand in other parts 
of our human life experience do not apply.  
  The science trump card works by way of a false analogy.  The base of the analogy 
is the relation of religion to early discoveries in science—say, in particular, astronomy.  
Christian doctrine for centuries taught that the universe had three tiers—heaven for 
reward, earth for divine testing, and hell for punishment.  But Copernicus and Galileo 
demonstrated, using direct observation combined with some mathematical calculations, 
that the earth was not the center of the universe.  While religious authorities resisted this 
finding for a very long time, they eventually were forced to accept the scientific evidence.  
They had to admit that astronomical bodies worked according to a system that was 
apparently independent of moral rewards and punishments in spite of the contradiction 
this presented to traditional religious belief.   
  Now rerun the story, changing “religion” to “ethics” and “astronomy” to 
“economics.” Direct observation and mathematical calculation demonstrate that market 
economies run thus-and-so, independent of how we might like or hope for them to run, 
and independent of our moral concerns, the story would go.  Ethicists must therefore, like 
the religious leaders of old, bow to these scientific findings—or so the analogy implies.  
  The weak link in this argument is that while astronomy started with direct 
observations, the economic theories referred to start not with observation but with a 
highly biased set of assumptions.  These assumptions about the subject matter of 
economics, about what it means to be human, and about methodology arguably do not 
accord well with observation and experience at all. 
  This paper describes these too-easily adopted assumptions, shows how they 
contain a high degree of arbitrariness and bias, and argues that conceptions of both ethics 
and economics can be made far richer and more adequate by loosening our attachment to 
the metaphorical image that “an economy is a machine.” 
3. Metaphor and the Ontology of Mechanism 
  “The essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in 
terms of another,” as linguist George Lakoff and philosopher Mark Johnson said in their  
book, Metaphors We Live By (1980, p. 5).  According to Lakoff and Johnson, and 
numerous other researchers in the areas of cognition, philosophy, rhetoric, and 
linguistics, metaphor is not merely a fancy addition to language, but is instead the 
fundamental way in which we understand our world and communicate our understanding 
from one person to another.  Lakoff and Johnson give many examples of how the 
language we use reflects metaphorical elaborations of more abstract concepts on the 
foundation of basic physical experiences.  Our perception of “up/down,” for example, GDAE Working Paper No. 03-11: Clocks, Creation, and Clarity 
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forms the basis for “good is up, bad is down,” “reason is up, emotion is down,” “control 
is up, subjection is down,” and “high status is up, low status is down.”  Richer meanings 
can be found in more complex metaphors such as “argument is war” (reflected in 
language like “win,” “lose”, “defend,” “attack”), “argument is a journey” (e.g. “step by 
step,” “arrive at conclusions”) or “argument is a building” (e.g. “groundwork,” 
“framework,” “construct,” “buttress,” “fall apart”).   
  These metaphors affect our understanding and our action: for example, if we 
perceive ourselves as engaged in an argument, how we interpret what we hear and how 
we respond depends in good part on which metaphor we use.  Metaphorical 
understanding is also culturally variable.  For example, as Lakoff and Johnson suggest, 
there could exist another culture that uses the metaphor “argument is dance” and so uses 
language of esthetics, style and synchronization.   
  The basic metaphor underlying the understanding of what an economy is, in the 
neoclassical view, is that “the economy is a machine.”  It runs by “mechanisms.” It is 
driven by “forces.” This is perhaps seems so obvious to us, so naturally true, that it is 
worth sketching the way in which economics grew out of a particular historical and 
cultural milieu in order to recognize that it is a metaphor.  
  As is well known, beginning in the sixteenth century in Europe the predominant 
conception of the relationship between humans and nature began to undergo a radical 
conversion.  In medieval times, humans had been seen as embedded in a living cosmos.  
From Galileo’s early work in mechanics, through Descartes’ elaborations and finally 
Isaac Newton’s culminating work, the idea of the world as a sort of giant clockwork 
mechanism, whose activity is reducible to components and forces describable in terms of 
laws and mathematics, radically changed the way people thought about the material 
world. 
  René Descartes split the world into a  “res cogitans” and a “res extensa.”  
Knowledge was seen as a part of the cogito, radically detached from passive matter.  
Descartes, of course, believed that the only knowledge that can count as true is that 
explained by theorem and proof, a la mathematical geometry. Sensory experience came 
to be regarded as not to be trusted. As Enlightenment thought further developed, people 
were encouraged to think of men as potentially detached, objective observers and 
controllers of nature.  Reason, seen as a force separate from bodily experience, was to be 
the path to clarity, certainty, and security. The mind—pictured as “over here” in the 
realm of res cogitans—would know and gain control over the world—pictured as “over 
there” in the realm of res extensa—by mentally figuring out the rules by which the 
clockwork runs.  The whole world was seen as, at base, a system of equations which the 
mind could discover. 
  Not surprisingly, when Adam Smith described economic and political life in the 
eighteenth century, he used the metaphors of his day.  “Power and riches” he wrote, are 
“enormous and operose machines” (1759 [1976], p. 182).  The “wheels of the political 
machine,” he continued, can be made to move in harmony when one attends to “the 
connexions and dependencies of its several parts” (1759 [1976], pp.185,186).  Smith is 
most noted, of course, for arguing (at least in one instance, in The Wealth of Nations—but 
this is what has become most famous) that individuals’ pursuit of their own self-interest GDAE Working Paper No. 03-11: Clocks, Creation, and Clarity 
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is made, by the amazing mechanism of a self-regulating market system, into service to 
the good of others: “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the 
baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address 
ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our 
necessities but of their advantages.”  Since Smith, self-interest has been assumed to be 
the energy source driving the gears of economic production.   
  These Enlightenment thinkers, of course, generally did not see (or at least, given 
the power of the Church of the day, express) any conflict or even break of subject matter 
between science and the sorts of questions of value and purpose expressed in religion and 
philosophy.  Smith, the author of The Wealth of Nations, was also the author of The 
Theory of Moral Sentiments. To most Enlightenment thinkers the notion of nature as a 
clock was inseparable from the notion of God the Clockmaker.  The world could be both 
mechanical and full of purpose and value, because it had purpose and value in God’s 
eyes.    
  Later scientists and philosophers, however, noticed that, in fact, the study of the 
clockwork moved along just fine without any notion of purpose, value, or ethics.  The 
notion of a Clockmaker became increasingly irrelevant to scientific work.  Secularism 
and a mechanical reductionism increasing took the place of rhapsodizing about divine 
intention in the practice of scholarly science and economics. Darwinian evolutionary 
theory accelerated this process, by positing a mechanism other than once-and-for-all 
divine design by which the living parts of the clockwork might have been elaborated.   
  Jumping forward a few centuries, we see these rationalistic and mechanistic 
images of humanity and nature still informing many projects in the natural and social 
sciences.  Some physical scientists, social scientists, and philosophers dream of 
consilience between the natural sciences and humanities—they believe that we are 
approaching a point in which all of existence, including all of human consciousness and 
ethics—will be understood in terms of a few fundamental natural laws (e.g., Wilson, 
1998).  
  Contemporary economics is dominated by the neoclassical paradigm, which is 
very much based on a Newtonian idea of a clockwork world. The focus is directed at the 
issue of choice behavior in the face of a fundamental scarcity of resources.  Under certain 
additional technical assumptions, choice behavior can be elegantly portrayed as an 
optimization problem solvable by standard calculus—very much like the Newtonian 
physics from which the model’s early developers (such as W. Stanley Jevons and Léon 
Walras, in the late 1800s) explicitly derived their inspiration.  
In order to make mathematical modeling tractable, however, economists have had 
to adopt a number of assumptions, such as that economic agents are autonomous, 
rational, and self-interested and that agents solve very simple maximization problems—
consumers maximize utility, and firms maximize profit. In the core model, it is also 
assumed that market coordination is the only, and only necessary, form of coordination 
among individual agents.  
Regarding questions of value, economists can shirk all concern with ethics by, 
first, assuming that the formation of consumer preferences is a subject outside of the 
scope of economics and that consumer sovereignty must be respected, and second, by GDAE Working Paper No. 03-11: Clocks, Creation, and Clarity 
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claiming that interpersonal comparisons of well-being are not scientifically justifiable. 
That is, it is assumed that whatever people want is best and that economists can say 
nothing about distribution.  
Efficiency, then, becomes the only measure of value about which economists 
have anything to say.  One of the big results of neoclassical economics is expressed in 
what is called the First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics: A perfectly 
competitive free market economy will be efficient.  By “efficient,” the economist means 
“Pareto efficient.”  A situation is Pareto efficient if there is no change that could make 
someone better off without making someone else worse off. By “perfectly competitive,” 
the neoclassical economist means that there are so many buyers and sellers in every 
market that none have any power to influence the price they pay or receive.
3   
Perfectly competitive firms, while acting out of self-interest, are not able to run 
inefficiently—say, with costs that are above their absolute minimum—because their more 
efficient competitors would run them out of business.  This culling of any high-cost firms 
is what is often referred to as “the logic of the market.”  
  As a corollary to the First Fundamental Theorem, most textbook expositions of 
neoclassical theory then go on to show how government “interference” in a free 
competitive economy—for example, through taxes, trade barriers, or social welfare 
transfers to the poor—reduces economic efficiency.  They may go on to argue, somewhat 
more loosely, that such interference also reduces private innovation and economic 
growth.  In this way, neoclassical economic theory provides an intellectual—and 
mathematically elegant—justification for neoliberal, minimal-government, free-trade and 
free-market policies, such as those recently propounded in the U.S. and Europe by 
conservative leaders, and for developing and transitional economies by the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank. 
  The mathematics of the neoclassical model are taken as representations of the 
unseen forces at work in the economic machine.  The mathematics also serves, 
conveniently, as a protection for the priesthood of economists.  Scholars in the 
humanities who might venture a criticism or want to examine an assumption can often be 
impressed or intimidated, we economists have discovered, by references to subgame-
perfect equilibria or heteroskedasticity. 
  Regarding ethics,  recently some attention has been given within economics to 
ethics in the form of social norms (such as of reciprocity and revenge).  However, the 
dominant approach has been to portray these reductionistically as evolved behaviors in 
service of the long-run self interest of the rational, self-interested, autonomous individual 
agent.  If, in some cases, certain social norms (such as for soldiers to sacrifice themselves 
during war) cannot be explained as helpful coordination mechanisms a self-interested 
human individual, then believers in the self-interest-and-optimization approach can fall 
                                                            
3 The core model is not the whole of mainstream economics, since the profession has expanded somewhat 
to include investigation of what happens when various assumptions of the core neoclassical model are 
loosened—generally one at a time.  Attention to non-competitive-market interactions using game theory, to 
transactions costs and behavioral factors, and more serious attention to market and government institutions 
characterize some approaches that are nevertheless considered fairly mainstream. Yet in each case, the core 
assumptions other than the one or two being weakened at the moment are usually assiduously maintained.   GDAE Working Paper No. 03-11: Clocks, Creation, and Clarity 
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back on analysis at the level of self-interested genes (see, e.g., Ben-Ner and Putterman 
1998).  
  In fact, in mainstream economics the agents are (perhaps surprisingly) rather 
passive and lacking in agency. Once you know the consumer’s utility function, 
everything else about the consumer can disappear.  The consumer’s purchase behavior 
rolls out automatically.  A firms’ profit maximization problem likewise reduces to a 
simple bowing to competitive market forces.  At their narrowest, neoclassical economists 
demand that all economic phenomena be explained entirely in terms of “economic 
fundamentals”—preferences and technology combined with market forces—leaving no 
space for moral agency or regard for  social or political movements. The system is locked 
up.  Real decisions of any kind—ethical or not—hardly come up at all.  A gear in a 
machine, after all, only does what the gear next to it pushes it to do. 
The ideas that there could be any fundamental sense of sociality and 
interrelatedness in human nature, or fundamental drive other than self-interest, or 
meaningful decisions to make, are not allowed to enter. Ethics, purpose, and value, in this 
view, disappear except perhaps as an interesting epiphenomenon of physics and 
evolution—similar to the current extreme reductionist view of religious feelings, that sees 
them as no more than neural activities in the temporal lobe of the brain. 
4. Economics and Ethics Within the Clockwork Image 
  How, then, can economics and ethics be reconciled?  Reading in this area, I have 
seen a wide variety of approaches—whose one common theme is that they accept without 
question the notion of economies as machines powered by self interest. 
  One approach is to continue to carry forth the God-the-Clockmaker image, 
explaining that yes, the world is a machine, but it’s God’s machine and hence moral.  In 
regard to economics, we see this in the assertions of scholars like Michael Novak 
(1981[1995]), for whom the free market is not only praiseworthy, it is a sign of God’s 
presence. Moral behavior in regard to economics, in this view, consists in keeping Adam 
Smith’s “enormous and operose” machine well-oiled and free of impediments. One must, 
of course, put enormous belief in the free market model, and enormous ethical weight on 
the value of individual freedom over economic justice, to accept this view in its pure 
form. 
  At the other extreme, some of the more mechanistic parts of Karl Marx’ writings 
strongly influenced radical struggles for justice for many decades.  Capitalism is powered 
by a drive for accumulation, it was said.  One of Marx’ stories—illustrated with 
equations—posited that contradictions within capitalism (most importantly, a falling rate 
of profit) would inevitably lead to its replacement by socialism.  This was a comforting 
thought, for those who sought greater economic equality.  Greed and class conflict would, 
presumably, automatically extinguish themselves.  Scientific Marxism seemed to offer a 
“hard,” theoretically justified road to achievement of an ethically desirable goal. To all 
but the most diehard scientistic Marxists, however, the accuracy of this model now 
appears highly questionable.  
  More often, in contemporary writings, religious and secular critics of 
contemporary capitalism fall back on dualistic thinking.  They take as true the idea that GDAE Working Paper No. 03-11: Clocks, Creation, and Clarity 
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businesses and market systems are machines. Generally, like Smith, these scholars see 
self-interest as the energy source of a market economy.  However, contrary to Smith and 
in line with more traditional religious and moral teachings, they note that self-interest 
often works against the social good. These scholars note that some people hoard wealth 
while others receive too little for their work to survive, and that ever-increasing 
consumerism may be bringing us to the brink of ecological collapse. As a result, 
contemporary markets systems are perceived of as in need of something—at least some 
adjustment or balance, or perhaps going farther, replacement— in order to meet ethical 
concerns. 
  There are several variants of dualistics approaches.  
  One is to set up a pessimistic dualism with irrevocably mechanical, self-interest-
driven markets on the one side, and a concern for purpose, value, morality and a higher 
good on the other. Max Weber’s contrast between the “iron cage” of irresistible technical 
and economic forces and the human search for meaning set the ground rules for 
engagement in sociology. In theology and philosophy, Reinhold Niebuhr’s claim that 
ethics at the level of the individual do not apply at the social level strongly influenced the 
thinking of his time and of many to this day. Starting from a reason vs. nature dualism, 
Niebuhr (1932 [2001]) argued that religion and reason are not enough to control the 
“natural impulses by which society achieves its cohesion....”—where “natural impulse” 
meant—for Niebuhr just as for Adam Smith—self-interest.    While this view allows for 
discussion of economics and ethics, the prognosis for economic justice is grim.  Ethics 
and economics play an agonistic game, with self-interest assumed to hold the stronger 
hand.  Perhaps apocalypse is on the way. 
Another sort of dualism is created when one thinks of our current economic 
systems as irretrievably “fallen,” and then looks entirely to “structural” or “systemic” 
changes for ethical relief. Writer Ken Jones (mentioned earlier) and feminist theologian 
Carol Robb (1995), for example, are among the many writers who argue that ethical 
demands require a thorough-going transformation of contemporary economic systems.   
The analysis tends to combine elements of mechanical thinking from neoclassical 
economics with somewhat more moralistic thinking with a Marxist flavor.  
That is, from neoclassical economics, they take the assumption that firms are units 
that maximize profits, and who are driven by competitive market forces to use the lowest 
cost production techniques.  However they notice that, for example, the drive to lower 
costs can result in workers being paid below-subsistence wages.
4  These critics, taking 
dire poverty as an ethical concern, conclude that market systems are inherently, by their 
own “logic,” damaging of human dignity.   
However, to this “logic of markets” story, they also add discussions of the power 
of corporations and/or of “global elites”—the directors of multinational corporations and 
international financial institutions.  There is a bit of a logical contradiction going on in 
this mixing of models, which is worth taking a slight side-track to point out. Within 
neoclassical economic theory, the idea that a free-market system creates the greatest 
                                                            
4 Within the Neoclassical model, such poverty is not a major focus, since people are assumed to be 
autonomous, choosing agents.  Consideration of consumption below the survival level would create an 
awkward “discontinuity” that would make the mathematical modeling less elegant.  GDAE Working Paper No. 03-11: Clocks, Creation, and Clarity 
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efficiency applies to a perfectly competitive economy.  When corporations have market 
and political power—as all but the most diehard neoclassical economists must admit that 
multinationals have, at least in some markets and countries—then neoclassical theory 
says that market forces are stymied—they will not do their job of forcing efficient 
outcomes.  As an empirical point, most large corporations do seem to run with some 
“slack,” which gives their directors more flexibility regarding their chosen policies—for 
good or ill.  
So once we recognize that market power gives companies some discretion, we are 
really bounced out of the perfect-competition-and-efficiency model, and into one that 
includes the possibility of some real choices. The critics, however, then immediately 
assume—based perhaps partly on the assumption that economic actors are fundamentally 
always self-interested, perhaps partly on an image of Marxian class struggle, and backed 
up by historical incidents of morally abhorrent corporate behavior—that such power will 
necessarily be used for “ill.” Power-hungry capitalists and greedy corporate elites will, it 
is assumed, use any discretion given to them by market power for further self-
aggrandizement.  
    Since, whether driven by “market logic” or greedy elites, capitalist economies 
spawn ever increasing assaults on human dignity, such critics suggest relatively drastic 
reforms. Robb, for example, accepts the notion of the machine-like functioning of 
economies but wants to change who is at its “controls.”  State intervention in line with 
the common good is prescribed, to replace selfish control by the corporate elites. Others, 
along a more utopian line, advocate completely replacing systems of corporations and 
markets with forms of organization that are more cooperative, more local, more 
democratic, and more directly in line with love-thy-neighbor ethical and religious 
teachings.  If contemporary systems are “fallen” and immoral, then, it is supposed, one 
must look to a thoroughgoing systemic or structural transformation for the advent of 
economic justice.  E.F. Schumacher’s (1973) Small is Beautiful would be an example of 
this kind of view. Herman Daly and John Cobb (1989) also look largely to issues of scale 
for relief.  We might group these together in a class called the “systemic critique.” 
  Rather than pit ethics against capitalist economies in general, another variant 
creates a dualism within existing contemporary economies. Part of the economy, it is 
suggested, can more or less safely be given over to “market values.” Presumably a-moral, 
mechanical markets can be allowed to operate in some realms where efficiency is highly 
valued—say, in provision of consumer goods.  But some realms of economic 
provisioning should be walled off from contamination from instrumental values, and held 
to higher standards.  Health care, education, and child care, for example, are among those 
spheres that are often thought of as needing protection from “commodification.”  The 
work of philosophers Elizabeth Anderson (1993) and Michael Walzer (1983) goes some 
way down this road, and this view is prevalent among a number of feminist theorists and 
social scientists.
5  We might call these, as a group, the “separate spheres” critique.  
                                                            
5 In response to the presentation of this paper at the Societas Ethica conference in 2003, Anderson 
acknowledged that in her earlier work she had focused too much on self-interest when dealing with market 
exchange, but said she had broadened her more recent research into issues such as the roles of trust and 
cooperation within market activity. For a review of such a dualistic view in the writings of some feminist 
ethicists and other theorists see Nelson and England (2002).  GDAE Working Paper No. 03-11: Clocks, Creation, and Clarity 
 
 
  10 
  In all of these views, the notion that markets fundamentally operate independently 
of our ethical concerns is taken for granted.  I find this unsatisfactory.  
My critique of the “systemic critique” and “separate spheres” scholars, it should 
be made clear, is not with their argument that values beyond self-interest and profit 
maximization should play an important role in economic life.  It is that “systemic 
critique” scholars too easily exclude the present economy, and “separate spheres” 
scholars too easily exclude the unprotected sphere of the economy, from ethical thinking.  
Both views assume that “the economy,” unmodified, is inevitably permeated by—driven 
by—the very narrow values posited by the neoclassical economic tradition.  There is little 
room in these arguments for the notion that people and organizations might be agents 
with moral responsibilities right now and right here—within contemporary economies.  
They also implicitly—and somewhat naively in my view—tend to assume that 
self-interest is limited to the market sphere.  They often seem to assume that if an 
organization is small, or incorporated as a non-profit, or governmental, then non-self-
interested motivations can be trusted to take over. Evidence of self-interest and violence 
within very small-scale organizations run according to values other than profit—such as 
families—should give us pause. Likewise a blind trust in the state (like a blind fear of the 
state) seems unwarranted. Yet some such dualism between the mechanical and the moral 
is endemic to discussions that take for granted that market economies are machines, and 
moral life must be lived elsewhere. 
  But—and here is where I believe the chance for a real branching past current 
limitations on thinking about ethics and economics opens up—do we have to believe that 
the economy is a machine?  Do we have to believe that self-interest is its sole “natural” 
energy source? The image is so familiar to us, and so tied up for centuries with our 
notions of science that it may be hard to think about what economic knowledge would 
mean outside of that image.   
5. A Feminist Critique of Mechanism 
  Feminist scholars such as Evelyn Fox Keller (1985) and Sandra Harding (1986), 
beginning in the 1980’s, began to point out the gendered nature of the mechanistic world 
view that arose during the scientific revolution.  Those things taken to distinguish “man” 
from “nature” during the scientific revolution were also taken to distinguish “man” from 
“woman.” Science was identified with masculinity, detachment, rationality, and 
domination of nature.  Nature was personified as feminine—and correspondingly seen as 
passive and submissive. Older views of nature as alive with interconnections and 
meaning, powerful, chaotic, and beyond mechanical control were dismissed as 
superstitious—as leading to belief in witchcraft, not science. The gender associations in 
the rise of science were sometimes explicit.  Henry Oldenburg, an early Secretary of the 
British Royal Society, stated, for example, that the intent of the Society was to “raise a 
masculine Philosophy  . . . whereby the Mind of Man my be ennobled with the 
knowledge of Solid Truths”  (Keller, 1985, p. 52). 
  Gender, in much of the feminist literature, is distinguished from sex: sex is used 
to refer to biological differences, while gender refers to social understandings constructed 
on the base of perceived physical sexual dimorphism. So the argument here is not that GDAE Working Paper No. 03-11: Clocks, Creation, and Clarity 
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women or nature “are” passive, in some essential way, but that both women and nature 
have been culturally and cognitively associated  with characteristics that were 
deliberately cast aside in constructing the notion of a “masculine” science.  The 
counterpoint to the rational, detached “man” of the Enlightenment age is, as historian of 
science Elizabeth Fee put it,   “... woman [who] provides his connection with nature; she 
is the mediating force between man and nature, a reminder of his childhood, a reminder 
of the body, and a reminder of sexuality, passion, and human connectedness.  She is the 
repository of emotional life and of all the nonrational elements of human experience.” 
(1983, p. 12).  Men and women both start out as children, have bodies, and are sexual and 
emotional beings —it is just that these characteristics have been purged from the notion 
of the Enlightenment “rational individual (man)” and projected onto its shadow, the 
image of the connected and natural woman. 
Following on this feminist scholarship of the 1980’s, feminist economists in the 
1990’s began to point out how gender biases have played out in contemporary economics 
(Ferber and Nelson, 1993; Kuiper et al., 1995; Nelson, 1996). The definition of 
economics according to markets, individual agents, efficiency and “positive” questions 
excludes families, society and institutions, equity, and normative concerns.  In seeking to 
be rigorous, precise, objective, mathematical and abstract, the profession pushes off to its 
margins anything that seems intuitive, vague, subjective, verbal, or overly concrete. The 
assumption that agents are self-interested, autonomous, rational choice makers puts into 
the shadow any social, other-regarding, interdependent, emotional, or habitual 
characteristics that may be important for explaining economic behavior.  The cultural 
connotation for what is favored is “hard” and “masculine,” while for the the disfavored 
the connotation is “soft” and “feminine.” 
  Take a few examples of the assumptions of the core neoclassical model, and 
notice what they leave out.   
  For example, the assumption that goods are fundamentally scarce is rather a 
different view of reality than one might expect to see arise in contemporary wealthy 
economies.  Another view might emphasize the abundance we have around us.  But one 
would search high and low in vain in economics to find the sort of basic attitude of 
gratitude for abundance expressed in the simplest religious dinner grace or harvest hymn. 
The neglect of enjoyment of economic life does, indeed, go back to Smith and have 
gendered overtones. Echoing Descartes’ trust in reason and distrust of experience, Smith 
made a distinction between our experience of economic life and satisfaction  and our 
reason which allows us to understand and admire the grand machine of economic 
industry. Smith wrote that we tend to ignore the “real satisfaction” that abundance brings 
in favor of focusing on “the regular and harmonious movement of the system, the 
machine or oeconomy” (1759 [1976], pp. 182-3). “And it is well that” we do so, Smith 
argued, since this fascination with system is what keeps industry humming.  Smith went 
on to commend the “active, resolute, and sober” character who would ignore the 
satisfactions of abundance in order to serve the economic machine, and derided the 
“slothful, effeminate, and voluptuous” character who would be less inclined partake in the 
spirit of industry (1759 [1976], p. 187, emphasis added).
6  The notion that sensual 
                                                            
6 Likewise, contemporary American religious thinker Peter Berger contrasts the traditional economic ethics 
of “hard work, postponing enjoyments, discipline, sobriety” with a new economic culture that arose in the GDAE Working Paper No. 03-11: Clocks, Creation, and Clarity 
 
 
  12 
enjoyment is feminine and to be repressed is reflected at the core of economic thinking. 
Descriptions of consumer behavior in contemporary economics, for example, do not 
emphasize notions of desire and enjoyment. Instead, consumers are said to try to get to a 
higher curve representing “indifference.”  Ethicists could use this: What a difference it 
could make to a consumer culture if people were actually encouraged to slow down and 
appreciate what they have! 
Notice, also, that when economic agents are assumed to be autonomous and self-
interested, then what gets pushed into the background are human connections and human 
concern for other people and the larger good. Social embeddedness is denied. Children, 
sick people, and frail elderly people are not recognized in the neoclassical model—they 
do not fit the assumption that individual agents are autonomous.  The people who out of 
concern nurture and care for them, often for little or no reward, are also not recognized by 
the model—they do not conform to the assumption of self-interest. Traditionally, these 
have been largely women.  
However, when open-minded researchers actually look at the values people bring 
to economic life, they overwhelmingly find more than self-interest that the mechanical 
model assumes. Within economics, experimental economists have noticed that subjects in 
various economic simulations regularly tend to cooperate “too much” relative to what is 
predicted by economic theory (Camerer and Thaler, 1995).  Researchers on 
organizational behavior and business ethics have found dimensions of loyalty, a search 
for purpose and meaning, identification with work and with community—even within 
corporations making widgets (Collins and Porras, 1994; Paine, 2002; Solomon, 1997). 
Yet emotions, connections, “soft skills”—all these have been made to seem less 
“rigorous” than the neoclassical assumptions. 
One may very well argue that non-self-interested motivations are too weak in 
economic dealings to lead to meaningful ethical behavior within contemporary economic 
systems.  I myself am not overly optimistic on this score.  But denying that they exist can, 
by undercutting them, very well help turn the emphasis on economic self-interest into a 
self-fulfilling prophecy. People who are told that economies run on greed are likely to 
conform themselves to what they believe to be the norm.  Researchers have found, for 
example, that taking college courses in neoclassical economics leads to a measurable 
decrease in cooperative behavior (Frank et al., 1993). 
  The emphasis on rationality in the narrow mainstream economic model is also 
worthy of suspicion.  While factors such as emotion and intuition are culturally coded as 
“feminine” as opposed to “masculine” logic, recent developments in psychology—most 
notably by Nobel Laureate psychologist Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (1994, 
2000)—have shown that real-life human decision making has many emotional, habitual, 
and otherwise not-perfectly-logical elements.  
  We could go on. Assuming that “firms maximize profits” means that dealing with 
the different interests and the variety of ethical understandings and types of knowledge 
that might be held by managers, workers, suppliers, customers, and shareholders can be 
ignored.  If the Asian financial crisis of 1995 was precipitated by bad internal and 
                                                                                                                                                                             
United States during the 1960s, which was “more libidinally positive, if you will ‘softer,’ more 
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external governance at Barings Bank, or the stock market plunge of 2002 was at least at 
part brought on by a crisis of trust after the news of the scandals at Enron, WorldCom, 
etc.—well, these incidents are, apparently, not quite core “economic” issues, by the 
neoclassical definition.
7  
  Assuming that market coordination is the only necessary form of coordination 
assumes away economic phenomena that occur at levels above and beyond that of the 
individual market transaction, like public goods, externalities, and the wielding of power. 
  Assuming that preferences are given means that the model takes no account of 
how our social environment or our own actions may rebound on what we want—or even 
effect who we believe ourselves to be. In the core model, for example, paid work enters 
only as something which brings in income while taking away from leisure.  There is no 
account for how we might find meaning, purpose, and enjoyment through our reaching 
out into the world in productive activity. Unpaid work done by women is usually not 
recognized at all. 
  And, of course, the assumption of no interpersonal comparisons eliminates all 
considerations of distribution and poverty. The many assumptions needed to make the 
neoclassical, mechanical, model tractable, then, are all quite open to question. 
  The feminist analysis suggests one reason why mechanical metaphors in 
economics have had staying power.  Any challenge to the basic metaphor or the 
assumptions of the core model can be dismissed by being called less “rigorous,” less 
“hard”—that is, more feminine, soft, relativistic, subjective, romantic, superstitious, 
voluptuous, etc. Making room for any of the factors on the excluded side of the gendered 
division of what is “economics” and what is “not economics” raises the risk that the 
image of the male scientist who is control of a passive and thoroughly knowable nature 
might have to be questioned.  This may be a scary thought.  It seems much safer to stay 
with an image of science that emphasizes a dry set of methodological stipulations or the 
inexorable discovery of cool natural laws.  Feminist analysis suggests that our cultural 
attachment to certain notions of science and economics may itself have social, 
psychological, historical and gendered roots.  
  Rather than accept the definition of economics as it is, Enlightenment roots and 
all, the feminist critique encourages us to look at its one-sidedness as an issue of bias 
rather than a sign of  “rigor.”  The neoclassical model elegantly describes a mechanical 
world that it has imagined for itself; feminist critique encourages us to question the 
relevance of such theories for the world in which we actually live and act. 
6. Changing Metaphors 
  What if we thought in terms of “an economy is a creative process”?  Or what if 
we thought in terms of “an economy is an organism”?
8 What if we thought of economies 
                                                            
7 For more on the theory of the firm, see Nelson (2003a).  
8 Because of various histories of association, metaphors may carry various meanings. To some readers from 
eastern Europe, for example, may associate the term “organism” with a Marxist idea that only the larger 
economy—and not individual persons—is important.  I thank discussants at the Societas Ethica conference 
for pointing this out. This is not the meaning intended here. The point of this paper is not to argue for one GDAE Working Paper No. 03-11: Clocks, Creation, and Clarity 
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as part of an ongoing process of creation, that involves us as full humans—bodies, ethics, 
and all?  What if we thought of science in terms of sustained, careful, open and purposive 
inquiry?  
  Such thinking would not rule out sometimes using the rhetoric reminiscent of 
nonliving machinery or structures. Talk of forces and mechanisms can sometimes be 
useful, since sometimes such talk highlights and gives insight to a specific item of 
concern.  But it would demand that the metaphor of  “an economy is a machine” be 
recognized as a metaphor as it is being used, not confused with universal truth.  That the 
mechanical metaphor tends to hide other aspects of reality should not be forgotten.  For 
example, within the metaphor “the economy is an organism” we can still have the 
(partial) understanding, “the economy is a structure.”  Consider: What makes a human 
being (organism) able to stand?  In part, it is the structure of the skeleton: a weight-
bearing system, analogous to a non-living bridge or building. Without a properly aligned 
skeleton, standing is impossible. But from another angle, one could name many other 
things—breath, circulation of blood, correct workings of the inner ear, willpower—that 
make a human able to stand. Take away any one of these, and standing is equally 
impossible, even if the skeletal structure is present. Likewise, an economy has an 
institutional structure of businesses, families, communities, governments, markets, 
regulations, standards, etc., and also is sustained, continually created, and potentially 
transformed by beliefs, norms, relationships, aspirations, concerns, satisfactions, and 
ethical reflections. 
  What the expanded metaphors could do is integrate us back into our economic 
world, integrate our purposes and values with the lives we actually live, locate us bodily 
and mentally at the point in time where our decisions—which are usually at the same 
time both economic and ethical—enter the flow of the world’s creation and, in a small 
way, change the future.  Perhaps instead of thinking of the economy as a machine that 
must always be run to produce more, we might pause and see if we enjoy what we have, 
and whether what our economies produce adds to the flourishing of human life and to the 
flourishing of all of creation.   Instead of either/or dualisms of reason vs. nature, or the 
divine vs. nature, or the ethical vs. the economic, a view of the world as constituted in 
purposive process allows both/and thinking.  The economy is in many places loose 
enough, alive enough, evolving enough to allow us choices—real choices—to act for 
good or ill.  Contrary to the conservative defenders of free market ideology, the economy 
is not a closed system.  Contrary to the critics of global capitalism, the economy is not a 
closed system. Thinking of the economy as a living, creative process, we can recover the 
idea that choosing and acting for good may be possible. 
7. Resources for a Non-Mechanistic View 
  While this paper is not the place to develop the expanded metaphors of organism 
and creative process at length, I can point to many developments in thinking about 
science, economics, and philosophy, that might inspire and inform a movement out of 
economy-as-machine thinking. 
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  One way to restate my argument, for example, would be to say that we have 
tended to take the economy as an “it” rather than as a “Thou.”   In Martin Buber’s famous 
philosophical piece on identity and relation, I and Thou,  he wrote about the fallacies of a 
non-relational worldview in which we imagine either “the world...embedded in the I, and 
that there is really no world at all,”  or  “the I...embedded in the world, and there is really 
no I  at all”   (1958, pp. 71-72).  The rather un-agenic agent of neoclassical economic 
theory is an prime example of both sides of this coin.  In concentrating attention on the 
choice processes of logic-driven autonomous individuals, the reality of bodily and social 
experience is made to disappear—the world is absorbed into the mental  I. On the other 
hand, the idea that firms are driven by competitive market forces, or that a consumer is no 
more than a pre-existing utility function, makes the I disappear, so only a world of 
unconscious clock-workings and equations remains. What is needed is a more relational 
image of how we develop as humans and act in our social and natural worlds.  
  Besides Buber’s work, resources for more process-oriented and relational thought 
in philosophy can also be found in the work of Alfred North Whitehead and in the school 
of American Pragmatism, expounded by scholars such as William James and John 
Dewey.
9  Work on ethics that does not fall back on absolutist notions of “natural law” can 
be found writings by Mark Johnson (1993) on the use of metaphor in moral imagination, 
and Martha Nussbaum (1995) on the relation of moral thinking to literature. Some 
feminist work on economic ethics and religion, such as by Sallie McFague (2001), also 
work beyond “natural law” theories towards understandings that include human creativity 
and responsibility.
10  
  Within economics, a less mechanical view was developed by the American 
Institutionalist School in the early decades of the 1900’s. While by the late 1930s it was 
overtaken by the rise of logical positivism, it had earlier been a force to be reckoned with. 
It was founded by thinkers such as John R. Commons and Thorstein Veblen who saw 
economies as evolving process, and the role of economists as addressing new problems 
related to human and social well-being as they arose (Nelson 2003b). Societies such as 
the European Association for Evolutionary Political Economy and the (American) 
Association for Evolutionary Economics currently carry on some of this work.  In 
replacing the mechanical metaphor of the neoclassical model with one that is more 
process-oriented the institutionalist school was in fact also joined by the school of 
Austrian economics, although that school, led by thinkers such as Friedrich Hayek, was 
considerably more optimistic concerning self-regulation of markets. 
Perhaps most interestingly, notions of science itself have undergone considerable 
flowering since the Enlightenment.  While neoclassical economics has stayed with a 
notion of science based on Newtonian physics, the actual natural sciences have (except 
for a continuing reductionist faction) moved on. In twentieth century physics, the 
development of quantum theory, the theory of relativity, and most recently the study of 
chaos and complexity reveals that the universe has non-mechanical, unpredictable, non-
linear, seemingly incommensurable, surprising and even “spooky” behaviors. While 
equilibrium, observability, predictability, control, simple determinism and continua 
                                                            
9  For more detail, see Nelson (2003b). 
10 Beverly W. Harrison’s (1985) use of the non-mechanical aspects of Marx’ social theory is also 
interesting.  See also discussions in Ann-Cathrin Jarl (2003) and Nelson (2003c). GDAE Working Paper No. 03-11: Clocks, Creation, and Clarity 
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characterized the seventeenth-century scientific thought imported into economics, 
contemporary physics finds these to be only characteristic of special cases. More 
generally, disequilibrium, effects of the observer on the observed, impossibility of 
prediction and control, jumpy or chaotic processes, emergence and systems that are more 
than just the sum of their parts demand non-mechanistic and non-reductionist approaches. 
 Quite turning the idea that social sciences should emulate the “hard sciences” on 
its head, for example, physicists Nigel Goldenfeld and Leo P. Kadanoff write in their 
introduction to a section of Science entitled “Beyond Reductionism,” 
Up to now, physicists looked for fundamental laws true for all times 
and all places. But each complex system is different; apparently there 
are not general laws for complexity. Instead, one must reach for 
‘lessons’ that might, with insight and understanding, be learned in one 
system and applied to another. Maybe physics studies will become 
more like human experience. (1999, p. 89) 
Meanwhile the contemporary theoretical physics of Ilya Prigogine (1997) combines the 
notion of natural “laws” (which are now only about probabilities) with the idea that time-
irreversible “events” lend “an element of radical novelty to the description of nature” 
Like Alfred North Whitehead, Prigogine does not see human creativity as opposed to (or 
as an illusion in the light of) natural regularities. Rather, his project leads towards “a 
science that views us and our creativity as part of a fundamental trend present at all levels 
of nature” and which is integrally linked to “the building of tomorrow’s society” (1997, 
pp. 7, 185).  
  Some of the most interesting recent developments, to my mind, have been those 
in cognitive psychology.  At the time of the Enlightenment, the big question of concern 
seemed to be  “What makes us different from (other) animals?” The answer given was 
“reason,” and reason was imagined to give humans control over (presumably) mechanical 
nature. Recently, however, with centuries of development of machinery leading to the 
advent of Artificial Intelligence and the prospect that computers might develop 
“thinking,” a new and in some sense diametrically opposed question has cropped up: 
“What makes us different from machines?” The answer given by many researchers is 
“bodies”—specifically human bodies and soft human brains, evolved to meet certain 
kinds of challenges in creative and constitutive interaction with certain kinds of 
environments. Studies of bodily experience, consciousness, phenomenology, subjectivity, 
and the role of the emotion in reasoning have recently been revived in status by cognitive 
scientists such as Gerald Edelman (2000), Antonio Damasio (1994), and Andy Clark 
(1997). 
  The mechanical metaphor begins to look more and more old fashioned, as well as 
damaging. 
8. Conclusion 
  To those who have not investigated the source and limitations of the clockwork 
metaphor of economic functioning, suggesting that it be replaced by a more “organic” or 
“creative” view sounds simply soft-headed.  “Sure, you can fit more ethical concerns in 
by taking economics to be a humanistic subject,” thinks the listener, “but that is not GDAE Working Paper No. 03-11: Clocks, Creation, and Clarity 
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rigorous, not scientific.” Referring to an “organic” conception is more likely to raise in a 
listener images of granola and New Age music, than of serious investigation into 
realities, economic and otherwise.   
  If my arguments cause you at least to pause and have a second thought before 
dismissing ideas such as that economies may be vital, or that our ethical selves are part 
and parcel of our economic selves, or that being “soft” in some senses might be OK, then 
it has served its purpose.  If it helps to bring ethical discussion more fully into economic 
discussions, with fewer excuses and fewer references to stale theories of social science 
inadequate for dealing with problems of poverty, discrimination and the ecological 
consequences of our economic behavior—this is even better.  
 
Julie A. Nelson is a Senior Research Associate at the Global Development and 
Environment institute at Tufts University, USA, and Sowell Visiting Professor of 
Economics at Bates College, USA. 
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